[Cross-Strait] Why Did the US Lose China Twice? From Arms Embargoes to the Taiwan Crisis
bella@@ 央廣 新聞1d ago
Voice of America, Washington: Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) issued a statement on Tuesday (June 16) reiterating, "We oppose any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, especially attempts to use force or coercion in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait."
Central News Agency reported on the 18th: President Lai Ching-te stated today that the United States' security commitment to Taiwan remains unchanged, and relevant arms sales are still under review. Taiwan will continue to strengthen its self-defense capabilities and looks forward to the smooth passage of related arms purchase cases after review by the US side.
Both news reports above point to the connection between Taiwan's security and the United States and the civilized world.
This article reviews history to reveal a historical truth long overlooked by mainstream society: after the two World Wars in the last century, the arms embargoes imposed by European and American countries on China out of goodwill ultimately led to the worst outcomes, rewriting the political landscape of China and Greater East Asia, and profoundly affecting the relationship between the United States and the Indo-Pacific. In a sense, the Pacific War between the US and Japan during World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars after World War II, are all closely related to these two arms embargoes.
I. Post-WWI Arms Embargo on China Changed China's Political Map
The Paris Peace Conference after World War I in 1919, which triggered the May Fourth Movement due to the Shandong issue, rarely noted the profound consequences for China and Greater East Asia of the decision on May 5th to impose an arms embargo on China.
One of the core principles of President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" was national self-determination and sovereign equality, and the prevention of future wars through the establishment of the League of Nations. Under this philosophy, Western countries considered the warlord infighting within China to be an internal affair. Therefore, around the 1920s, the US, UK, and other countries began to strictly limit arms exports to the Chinese government.
This well-intentioned policy, however, prevented the Beiyang government, representing China, from purchasing modern armaments from Europe and America. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and Japan, due to geographical proximity, continued to sell weapons to China. The Soviet Union, in particular, began to systematically aid revolutionary forces in the south after 1923. Through Sun Yat-sen's "Alliance with the Soviet Union and Acceptance of Communist Support" policy, a large number of Soviet military advisors, instructors, funds, and weapons entered Guangzhou by sea, establishing the Whampoa Military Academy. The Communist Party's influence subsequently expanded, making them an important agent of the Comintern in China. Ultimately, the Beiyang government gradually fell behind in terms of finance, military equipment, and organizational mobilization capabilities, while the revolutionary forces in the south, with Soviet support, rapidly grew, leading to the success of the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition and the widespread growth of the Communist Party in China.
While the failure of the Beiyang government was due to internal factional infighting, financial exhaustion, and lack of political legitimacy, the arms embargo deprived it of a crucial channel to obtain modern armaments from Europe and America. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union could continuously support the revolutionary forces in the south, exacerbating the power imbalance. The limited civil war among China's Beiyang warlords, due to the power imbalance caused by the arms embargo, escalated into a three-dimensional conflict:
First, the nature of the civil war changed: from a war where the Kuomintang and the Communist Party jointly opposed the Beiyang government to a civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
Second, geopolitical competition in Northeast Asia intensified: the establishment of Soviet regimes by the Chinese Communist Party was essentially a political proxy for the Comintern and the Soviet Union in China. This stimulated the rise of Japanese militarism, leading to intense geopolitical competition among the Soviet Union, Japan, and China.
Third, Japan, stimulated by the expansion of Soviet influence in China, launched a full-scale invasion of China, which in turn led to US intervention and the eventual outbreak of the Pacific War.
Reflecting on the arms embargo on China established at the Paris Peace Conference on May 5, 1919, and its subsequent chain reactions, we must ask: why did the well-intentioned European and American desire to respect national sovereignty ultimately bear bitter fruit? It not only brought suffering to the Chinese people but also had disastrous consequences for Greater East Asia and the United States.
II. Post-WWII Arms Embargo on China Led to the Republic of China Government's Retreat to Taiwan
After Japan's defeat in 1945, the United States hoped that China would achieve a "coalition government" through political negotiation to avoid a full-scale civil war. In October 1945, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party signed the "Double Tenth Agreement," confirming the principles of peaceful nation-building, political consultation, and nationalization of the military. However, shortly after the agreement was signed, the Communist Party, relying on the strategic advantage gained from Soviet occupation of the Northeast, rapidly expanded its military by taking over Japanese leftover weapons and industrial facilities.
In 1946, US President Truman dispatched George Marshall to China for mediation and, in the summer of the same year, pushed for an arms embargo against the Nationalist government, suspending some arms exports and military aid in an attempt to force both sides to cease fire and negotiate. Due to the US arms embargo on the Nationalist government, the balance of power between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party rapidly reversed, and the Nationalist government was unable to recover. After the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign in 1949, the Nationalist government lost the mainland, the Republic of China's rule on the mainland failed, and the United States lost China.
"Why the US Lost China" became a hot topic of discussion in mainstream American society after World War II. One of the direct reasons was that the US imposed an arms embargo on the Nationalist government during a critical period when it was confronting a Chinese proxy supported by the Soviet Union (of course, the Nationalist government's own major policy errors, economic collapse, and other factors also played a role). This decision not only reshaped the destiny of China and East Asia but also brought tremendous shocks to the United States and the West.
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the United States was forced to invest enormous strategic resources in East Asia for a long time. The Korean War resulted in approximately 36,000 US military deaths and over 100,000 wounded; the Vietnam War resulted in 58,220 US military deaths and over 150,000 wounded. Both wars consumed enormous financial resources and profoundly affected US domestic politics and international strategic arrangements.
III. A Third Arms Embargo Could Lead the Republic of China (Taiwan) into a Severe Crisis
Historically, two arms embargoes by Europe and America on China led to two major setbacks for the Republic of China.
Currently, if the US, due to similar idealistic thinking or international factors, continues to delay arms sales to Taiwan, imposes conditions, or imposes substantial restrictions, the Chinese Communist Party may misjudge the US determination to protect Taiwan. Just as Mao Zedong launched an attack in 1949 after learning that the US would not intervene in the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign, ultimately leading to the current division of the two sides of the strait.
If a conflict erupts and escalates into a protracted war similar to the Russia-Ukraine war, the South China Sea will become the main battlefield. Its impact will far exceed that of the Russia-Ukraine and US-Iran wars: as a core channel for maritime trade in the Indo-Pacific, neighboring economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore will be severely hit; Taiwan's chip and global high-tech supply chains will be disrupted, and normal trade between the US and the Indo-Pacific region will be unsustainable. Once a Taiwan Strait conflict breaks out, the impact on the global economy and industrial chains will be immeasurable.
More seriously, the Chinese Communist Party may spare no effort, including resorting to nuclear threats, to seize Taiwan. If successful, the US will lose Taiwan as a strategic foothold, the South China Sea will be effectively controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, and countries in the Indo-Pacific region may quickly succumb to the CCP's hegemony.
The United States must not repeat the mistakes of history. Only by vigorously upgrading arms for Taiwan and firmly deterring the CCP's ambition for a military takeover can peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region truly be maintained.
Conclusion
History never simply repeats itself, but it often warns future generations in similar ways. Both arms embargoes stemmed from a well-intentioned desire for peace but ultimately profoundly changed the destiny of China and East Asia. Today's Taiwan issue is not only about Taiwan's fate but also a critical issue for the Indo-Pacific order and the strategic stability of the free world. How to avoid a third historical misjudgment will test the political wisdom of the United States and the civilized world. (Editor: Xu Jiayuan)
Author: Wu Zuolai, Independent scholar, columnist.
Source Link: https://www.rti.org.tw/news?uid=3&pid=216192
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